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Abstract 
 
Arguments are advanced for two ways in which we can avoid the reckless 
endangerment of future people in the governance of solar radiation management 
(SRM) research, which could happen through lock-in to SRM deployment from 
research. SRM research is at an early stage, one at which the mechanisms of lock-
in could start to operate. However, lock-in fit to endanger future people could be 
slowed or stopped through targeted governance. Governance of SRM research 
that does not include provisions to detect, slow, or stop lock-in fails the test of an 
intergenerationally adequate precautionary principle, and research governed 
without these provisions cannot itself be justified as a precaution against the 
impacts of climate change. 
 
Key words: Solar radiation management, intergenerational justice, precaution, 
lock-in, geoengineering, climate justice. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since Paul Crutzen made solar radiation management (SRM) a respectable topic 
for enquiry by the scientific community (Crutzen 2006), there has been a huge 
increase in the interest paid to SRM by natural scientists, and by scholars 
concerned to assess the social and economic costs and benefits of the 
technologies.1 Ethical questions that arise for research have been given far less 
attention than those that arise for deployment.2 This may be because it is taken 
as obvious that there is nothing special about research into SRM that grounds 
distinctive ethical concerns that should inform governance of the research, 
especially in the early stages of modelling, lab experiments, and small-scale field 
 
1 Despite the fact that only 8% of the lay public were able to correctly define the 
term ‘geoengineering’ in a 2010 survey (Corner et al. 2012). More recent work 
suggests greater levels of public awareness (Wibeck et al. 2017). 
2 There are exceptions (Hamilton 2013, Morrow et al. 2013).  
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testing. On this view, singling out SRM research as requiring governance in line 
with distinctive ethical concerns without applying that same standard to other 
scientific research programmes is lopsided and unfair (Heyward 2015). The 
zeitgeist with respect to SRM research seems to be that the most that is justified 
right now is self-regulation, perhaps using guiding principles and codes of 
conduct, such as the Oxford Principles (The Royal Society 2009, Rayner et al. 
2013, Hubert et al. 2016). Furthermore, many reports on governance to date 
advocate an ‘allowed zone’ for research (Cicerone 2006, Morrow 2017, p. 12-13). 
 
Questions about the governance of research are urgent: a prominent field 
experiment is due to take place within the next year or two and the pace may 
pick up thereafter.3 There are signs that geoengineering is catching the attention 
of legislators and climate diplomats: the US Senate appropriations committee 
recently passed a spending bill that included funding to support geoengineering 
research (Nuccitelli 2016); there have been recent US house subcommittee 
hearings on geoengineering; and the head of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), Hoesung Lee, has said that Panel should be examining 
geoengineering - including its governance - very seriously (Goldberg 2016). 
These developments sit alongside reports of concerns expressed by major 
figures in the SRM research community that research is ‘under provided’, and 
that governance is needed to make good on this.4  
 
Here, I argue that in order to take seriously our moral obligations to future 
people, the governance of research into SRM must, at the very least, contain 
provisions to enable the shackling, or even the shutdown, of research 
programmes under conditions in which it is clear that such research cannot 
stand as a plausible precaution against climate change. These are conditions in 
which the research itself creates dangers requiring precautionary action. I argue 
that if any governance proposal for SRM research does not include provisions 
 
3The experiment will be run through Harvard’s Solar Geoengineering Research 
Program. See https://geoengineering.environment.harvard.edu/ 
4 See Geoengineering Research Governance Project (GRGP) Oxford Workshop on 
a Code of Conduct for Responsible Geoengineering Research – Anna-Maria 
Hubert | FCEA 2017) 
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and mechanisms that enable this action, it should be rejected by those 
considering it because it recklessly endangers the interests of future people. 
These requirements are far more demanding than any existing code for self-
regulation by the SRM research community, and they imply that there should be 
no a priori allowed zone for research, including early stage indoor research 
involving modelling and lab experiments.5 
 
In what follows, I shall assume that aggressive mitigation to achieve the Paris 
Agreement’s 1.5C or 2C targets in the next 50 years is very unlikely. This explains 
why a call for accelerated research into SRM may gain traction outside of the 
SRM research community. Even if all parties achieve their Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) we may still see temperature rises of at least 2.6C by 2100 
(Rogelj et al. 2016), and many climate experts now accept that there will be 
significant overshoot of temperature targets in the decades prior to 2100 (Rogelj 
et al. 2015, CAT 2016, Schleussner et al. 2016).6 Knowing this helps to explain 
the potential appeal of SRM, which could (its advocates claim) cool the planet 
quickly and relatively cheaply, thus enhancing our chances of meeting the Paris 
Agreement targets by buying more time for mitigation (Keith 2013, MacMartin et 
al. 2014).7 I shall also take it for granted in what follows that we have moral 
obligations to future people, including those not yet born (Gosseries and Meyer 
2009, McKinnon 2012). I shall assume that whatever theory we have of these 
obligations, they prohibit the reckless endangerment of the fundamental 
interests future people have in secure access to water, food, shelter, as well as 
the protection of their physical integrity and social needs.8  
 
 
5  Thus, I address at least two of the ‘key unresolved questions’ of SRM 
governance identified by David Morrow (Morrow 2017), related to the objectives 
of climate engineering governance, and the role of precaution in that governance.  
6 Factoring in the ratcheting up of emissions reductions as per the Paris 
Agreement could affect this range, but it would not be unduly pessimistic (given 
the record of history) to be sceptical about the prospects for effective ratcheting 
up.   
7 For a skeptical take on these claims see (Barrett et al. 2014).  
8 For many, Henry Shue’s conception of ‘basic rights’ captures this basket of 
social, political and environmental preconditions for human life with dignity 
(Shue 1996).  
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My arguments here do not support a moratorium on research. Instead, I see 
them as pushing us towards being much more honest about how much our 
present institutions would have to change in order for them to provide a basis 
for the ethically adequate governance of SRM research: simply building out from 
the institutions we have at present is unlikely to enable the right bar to be met 
(Gardiner 2014). The right attitude to this fact is not despair. Rather, we should 
see the present vacuum of governance for SRM research as an unusual 
opportunity to be bold in building new institutions, structures and processes fit 
to provide robust and ethically adequate protection to future people.9  
 
The problem of governing SRM research 
 
The governance of SRM research can be more or less ‘shackling’ or ‘stimulating’. 
Governance that is very stimulating is fit to enable SRM research programmes to 
progress at speed to large-scale field tests, with a view to the development of 
deployable technology. Such governance could: facilitate a global coordination of 
research councils to make SRM research a priority; place no (or very minimal) 
requirements on researchers to engage in public consultation about proposed 
field experiments; authorise, support and direct SRM research in a narrow but 
deep ‘club’ agreement; or authorise unilateral research funded by private people, 
or corporations. In contrast, very shackling governance frameworks are those fit 
to significantly slow down research programmes, perhaps to stasis. Such 
governance could: require the consent of all affected by large-scale experiments; 
prohibit continuation of a research programme if all the risks it creates cannot 
be fully specified in advance; prohibit research unless all countries ratify a 
demanding global convention for the governance of research activities; or, place 
stringent limits on the financial support that can be given to SRM research in any 
national context.  
 
 
9 I do not think that wide-eyed optimism about the prospects for this 
opportunity being grasped is supported by the history of climate politics, nor its 
current state. Nevertheless, hope for this outcome can be consistent with, and 
justified at the same time, as pessimism about it (McKinnon 2014). 
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How ought we evaluate governance proposals along the shackling-stimulating 
spectrum in ways that capture what we owe to future people? One problem in 
thinking about this question is that there is deep uncertainty about the 
consequences for future people of any type of governance we adopt. Given this, 
the context in which choices about SRM governance are being made is 
sometimes presented as requiring a ‘risk-risk trade-off’ (Reynolds and Fleurke 
2013): there are serious risks created by doing the research and deploying SRM, 
but also serious risks created by not doing the research and not deploying, given 
the realities of climate change. This frame suggests that the evaluation of 
governance proposals must focus on weighing the risks created by different 
proposals. The animating thought behind this frame is that once we decide on 
how to rank these risks, we will have a rudder to guide our choice of governance 
proposals. 
 
Using this frame, the risks to be traded off can be thought of in the following way. 
On the one hand, if we govern in shackling ways that prevent or slow SRM 
research such that a deployable technology is not developed in the next century 
or so, warming of 2.6C or higher could be on the cards and we are deeply 
uncertain about the long-term consequences of that. At worst, the effects 
warming at 2.6C or above by 2100 could be catastrophic (Hauer et al. 2016, Mora 
et al. 2017): one nightmare scenario is speedy runaway warming, perhaps as a 
result of climate sensitivity having a much higher value than best estimates to 
date (Friedrich et al. 2016, Tan et al. 2016). In the face of this danger, stimulating 
governance that would kickstart a vigorous SRM research programme as soon as 
possible is sometimes presented as the best way to ‘arm the future’. By 
stimulating SRM research through governance now, the argument goes, we can 
bequeath to future people a technology that: could enable them to buy additional 
time for an aggressive mitigation effort; limits climate impacts on the world’s 
poorest people (Horton and Keith 2016, Keith and Irvine 2016); and thereby 
minimises future adaptation needs. By arming the future in this way, the 
argument goes, we can benefit both future people who might otherwise have had 
these adaptation needs, and also future people who would have to bear the cost 
of providing for these needs (Gardiner 2010). 
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The risks on the other side of the trade-off relate to the possible long-term 
consequences of deployment. If we govern to enable and stimulate SRM research 
so that it aims at delivering a deployable technology as soon as possible, we 
could lock in a pathway that commits us to deployment, and we are deeply 
uncertain about the long-term consequences of that (Robock 2008). We do not 
know whether the long-term impacts of deployment of SRM would be beneficial 
or catastrophic. Furthermore, we do not know whether governance that 
stimulates research would create ‘moral hazard’, nor how severe and long-lived 
this effect would be (Hale 2012, Baatz 2016). That is, we do not know whether 
SRM research would dilute commitment to emissions reductions (such as it is) 
and lead to a reduction in the rate of decrease, or instead (as some in the SRM 
research community hope) would galvanise political will on emissions 
reductions and buy much needed time for humanity to aggressively mitigate. 
Indeed, one of the calls for more research on SRM is often justified in terms of 
the need to reduce these uncertainties, so as to be better placed to weigh the 
risks of SRM against the risks of climate change in a policy-relevant way 
(Reynolds and Fleurke 2013). 
 
 
How not to evaluate governance of SRM research 
 
Faced with deep uncertainty in all directions about the consequences of 
governance that would stimulate or shackle research, can an ethical concern for 
the interests of future people provide guidance with respect to the evaluation of 
proposals for the governance of SRM research in the present? One way forward 
is to try to eradicate all uncertainty – or as much as we can – in order to employ 
techniques of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate risks created by different 
governance pathways so that they can be ranked. Whatever apparent progress 
can be made with cost-benefit analysis, it is premised – at the very least – on 
assumptions about the values of variables that generate the social discount rate 
that are unjustified given a proper ethical concern for the interests of future 
people (Gardiner 2011, Caney 2014, Jamieson 2014). Putting that aside, cost-
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benefit analysis can enable full evaluation of competing stimulating and 
shackling governance proposals only if the techniques can be applied across the 
board to the range of dangers created by each pathway. If this proves possible 
then there is not deep uncertainty associated with the outcomes of all types of 
governance proposals, and we can choose paths that minimise expected damage 
to future people. Those who think that we know (or can come to know in a time 
frame enabling evaluation of governance frameworks needed now) the exact 
probabilities of all the outcomes created by doing, and refraining from, SRM 
research, can stop reading now (Goes et al. 2011, Bellamy et al. 2012).  
 
For those who take uncertainty and our obligations to future people seriously 
(Tedsen and Homann 2013), a different approach is to assess governance 
proposals according to how well they meet standards of precaution in the face of 
future climate impacts (Elliott 2010, Morrow 2014) . There are at least two 
scenarios in which to make this case. First, SRM research could stand as a 
precaution against these possible impacts as a result of parties’ failures to fulfil 
their pledges under the Paris Agreement. Second, the research could stand as a 
precaution against these impacts despite parties’ successes in fulfilling their 
pledges. In the second case, the future climate change to which we are already 
committed, combined with the inadequacy of the present NDCs with respect to 
maximising the likelihood of exceeding 2C (let alone 1.5C) by 2100, could create 
a future world of climate catastrophe. In the first case, the parties’ failure to 
achieve their inadequate NDCs could make things even worse.  
 
In the face of these possible futures, the precautionary argument for governance 
to stimulate research is sometimes extended as follows. Without a well-
researched, tested, safe, deployable SRM technology we are left open to the 
possibility that an unsafe, under-researched, untested SRM technology will be 
deployed in a climate emergency. To protect ourselves against this outcome, we 
ought to do the research now (Parson et al. 2013). This argument is too sanguine 
about what could make any deployment unsafe. It is far from fanciful to worry 
that a ruthless political regime could see deployment as an opportunity to 
perpetuate existing unjust distributions of power and resources. Given this 
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possibility, the assumption that a deployable technology delivered by a well-
governed research programme starting now would ipso facto result in – or even 
make more likely – safe deployment in the future looks less well supported.  A 
well-researched and tested technology could be more dangerous than an 
untested technology in the hands of a ruthless regime precisely because it would 
be more likely to work. Any argument for governance to stimulate research 
should not take a hidden punt on future political contexts being free from 
regimes that would seek to use the technology for their own unjust and/or 
illegitimate purposes.  
 
The argument for precautionary action to stimulate SRM research in the face of 
future climate impacts requires not only that these impacts are possible, but 
further that they are above some threshold of probability beyond which the costs 
involved in taking the action are justified.10 However, if we do not know the exact 
probabilities of these impacts, how can we know whether they are above any 
threshold of probability? The right approach here is to make a distinction 
between exactitude in our judgements of the probability of uncertain outcomes 
and accuracy in our judgements about whether these outcomes are above some 
threshold of probability: judgements of the latter type can be well founded when 
judgements of the former type are not. Shue ( 2010, p. 147; 2015) defends this 
method: ‘one can reasonably, and indeed ought to, ignore entirely questions of 
probability beyond a certain minimal level of likelihood’. In these cases, Shue 
thinks, we are required to take precautionary action to minimise the dangers. 
These cases have the following features:11 
 
10 For a more general statement of the precautionary approach to climate change 
see Gardiner (2006), McKinnon (2009). For general criticism of precautionary 
approaches see (Sunstein 2005)(Sunstein 2007)(Sunstein 2007). It worth noting 
that even Sunstein accepts that a precautionary principle is justified in the face of 
possibly catastrophic climate change (Sunstein 2007). Excellent recent 
treatments of the precautionary principle are (Steel 2014, Hartzell-Nichols 
2017).  
11 Shue identifies an additional third feature not listed here, as follows: ‘(3) non-
excessive costs: the costs of prevention are not excessive (a) in light of the 
magnitude of the possible losses and (b) even considering other important 
demands on our resources’. (2010, p. 148). I shall take it to be straightforward 
that prevention costs are non-excessive in both the case of warming above 2C 
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massive loss: the magnitude of the possible losses is massive; 
threshold likelihood: the likelihood of the losses is significant, even if no 
precise probability can be specified, because the mechanism by which the 
losses would occur is well understood, and the conditions for the 
functioning of the mechanism are accumulating (Shue 2010, p. 148). 
 
Massive loss and threshold likelihood are clearly present in the cases of climate 
impacts consequent on successes or failures of the Paris Agreement. With 
respect to massive loss, climate change is already causing enormous damage to 
the most vulnerable people in the world. Regardless of whether parties meet 
their NDCs, committed climate change could become runaway climate change 
with truly catastrophic outcomes for future people. With respect to threshold 
likelihood (Shue’s second condition), we know how and why climate change 
happens, we know that our continued greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
massive land use changes are exacerbating climate change, we know with very 
high levels of confidence how climate change causes devastating impacts, and we 
know that these impacts are getting worse. Our knowledge of the mechanisms by 
which warming happens, and the mechanisms by which it impacts on human 
beings, is not complete; but what we do know is ‘well understood’. 
 
Given that climate impacts lie above a threshold for precautionary action, is 
governance that stimulates SRM research part of a package of precautionary 
measures required to protect the fundamental interests of future people? This 
case is not at all obvious. Commenting on this type of argument as it applies to 
 
and the case of governance stimulating SRM research. In the climate case, the 
costs are those created by mitigation. In the SRM case, the costs are those 
created by not doing the research. Given the early-days state of research into 
SRM, these costs are almost entirely opportunity costs. Some SRM researchers 
make the case that this research could enable us to learn important things that 
would also benefit mitigation efforts, e.g. with respect to clouds. Granting this, if 
massive loss and threshold likelihood are satisfied in the case of governance 
stimulating SRM research, these opportunity costs are far from excessive, 
especially given that we may be able to learn these important things about 
clouds by other means.   
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deployment, Lauren Hartzell-Nichols reflects that, ‘SRM strategies that pose new 
or further threats of catastrophe cannot be considered as an appropriate 
precautionary measure against climate change since there are other 
precautionary measures – mitigation and adaptation measures – that could be 
taken to greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the threats of catastrophe climate 
change threatens’ (Hartzell-Nichols 2012, p. 165). Hartzell-Nichols makes her 
argument only with respect to the deployment of SRM as a precaution against 
the possible worst effects of committed climate change and does not extend the 
reasoning to SRM research and its governance. However, I think the argument 
can and should be extended in this way. If governance that stimulates 
enthusiastic SRM research is itself a token of the type of case Shue identifies as 
liable to precautionary action, then this governance and the research it 
stimulates cannot itself stand as a precaution against the future impacts of 
climate change.  
 
A better way to evaluate governance of SRM research 
 
I shall examine some conditions under which governance to stimulate SRM 
research meets Shue’s massive loss and threshold likelihood conditions.12 The 
point of identifying these conditions is not to assert emphatically that 
governance to stimulate SRM research must, or does, satisfy them: this is an 
empirical question. Rather, the point of identifying the conditions is to enable 
specification of some demanding requirements on stimulating governance of 
research if it is to be justified as a precautionary action against future climate 
impacts. 
 
With respect to massive loss, we must start by recognising that there are many 
things that could cause the abrupt suspension of SRM deployment: for example, 
war, sabotage, or natural disaster. If deployment were to be abruptly suspended, 
 
12 This discussion is not exhaustive. For example, if concerns about moral hazard 
turn out to be empirically well grounded, shutdown provisions in research 
governance should be activated because a failure to curb emissions as a result of 
moral hazard would make climate impacts far worse than they would have been 
otherwise. 
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global average temperatures would be likely to rise very quickly to pre-
deployment levels. Some studies suggest a similar, although less pronounced, 
effect on precipitation (See Figure 1. See also Jones et al. 2013, Keller et al. 2014, 
Zhang et al. 2015). This ‘termination shock’ would be damaging to future people 
both as a result of the impacts of the temperature rises (and other changes) 
previously masked by deployment, but also because of the speed at which these 
impacts would occur (Goes et al. 2011, Svoboda et al. 2011, Reynolds et al. 2016). 
In a termination shock, climate impacts that would have taken decades or longer 
to materialise as a result of cumulative emissions would be felt within a matter 
of years, causing great damage to people affected by the shock, especially the 
most vulnerable (Baum et al. 2013, MacMartin et al. 2014, Keith and MacMartin 
2015). The severity of the termination shock will depend on the length of the 
deployment, the degree of mitigation that has happened under deployment, and 
the resilience of natural and social systems that have developed under 
deployment. Multi-century deployments with little mitigation could mean that 
natural and human systems have next to no chance of adapting to these changes 
in the short term, with devastating consequences for medium to long term 
mitigation and adaptation action. Even advocates of research into temporary and 
limited deployment used only to constrain the rate of change of global mean 
temperature, rather than to stabilize temperature at some acceptable level 
(MacMartin et al. 2014, Keith and MacMartin 2015), accept that abrupt 
termination would cause damage (Cairns 2014).13  
 
The possibility of massive losses caused by a termination shock is relevant to 
thinking about the governance of research if there are well-understood 
mechanisms that could lock-in a path from research to deployment. If such 
mechanisms exist, the first part of what is needed for threshold likelihood is 
 
13 It should also be noted in this context that the range of scenarios in which SRM 
deployment is imagined are all framed in ways that have significant 
consequences for assessment of the acceptability of deployment in those 
scenarios. In their review of the literature assessing geo-engineering proposals, 
Bellamy et al. provide evidence that a number of frames that could support far 
less favourable assessments of deployment are routinely excluded from 
scenarios  (Bellamy et al. 2012, p. 605, Fragniere and Gardiner 2016). 
 13 
present in the SRM research case, namely a well-understood mechanism by 
which massive losses can be brought about. Broadly speaking, a society has 
become locked in to a particular technology, system, form of organisation, or 
framing of an issue when the reasons for not abandoning the locked-in feature 
are a function of the high costs of doing this, rather than the benefits and 
advantages of the locked-in feature itself (Jamieson 1996). Features of a society 
that are locked-in can persist and dominate even when there are many better 
ways to pursue the ends, or arrange the affairs, in question.14 Lock-in of SRM 
research programmes, and lock-in from any programme to deployment, could 
happen as a result of positive feedbacks in four categories.15  
 
First, economies of scale: any particular SRM research programme is likely to be 
expensive to get started; and once started, the continued funding of (and any 
progress made by) that programme makes it harder for alternative programmes 
to launch, even when they have clear potential to be better than the already 
existing programme. At a certain point in any programme, the only way to field 
test the technology is to actually deploy on a global scale, even if outdoor 
experiments start on a smaller scale (Hamilton 2013, Klein 2014). And once 
research-through-deployment is happening the space for that type of field 
experiment for any other SRM research programme is – quite literally – already 
filled with the existing technology.  
 
Second, learning effects: as any research programme advances, perhaps to the 
point of research-through-deployment, the opportunities for learning in ways 
that enable improvement and fine tuning of the technology accumulate. 
Alternative programmes cannot match this, which progressively weakens the 
case for their initiation and funding. 
 
 
14 The meaning of ‘better’ in this context depends on the nature of the locked in 
feature. For example, ‘better’ for technologies could mean more effective and 
cheaper; for frames for social issues, it could mean ‘fairer’. 
15 These four sites of positive feedback causing lock-in of SRM are adapted from 
Foxon (2007). 
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Third, adaptive expectations: it need not take long for a ‘new normal’ to take 
root. Human beings have a well-documented status quo bias which could operate 
quite quickly to adjust their preferences to any SRM research programme 
actually in existence, even if there are potential alternatives that are better 
(Kahneman et al. 1991). Furthermore, ‘environmental generational amnesia’ 
(Kahn 2011) – whereby the baseline for judging environmental degradation 
becomes less demanding over generations as degradation actually happens – 
could make the expectations of children born within a period of research-
through-deployment radically different from those of their parents by the time 
they grow up. Perhaps only nostalgic ‘old fools’ with ‘lighted rooms’ inside their 
heads would mourn for lost blue skies and starry nights (Larkin 1974).  
 
Fourth, co-ordination effects: the more research programmes in other countries 
are initiated and developed, the more it is to any country’s advantage to 
accelerate their own research programme. Given that any research programme 
must eventually field test through actual global deployment, the existence of any 
research programme in a national content makes deployment much more likely 
overall. The obvious analogue here is the nuclear arms race. 
 
These four sites of positive feedback, and various combinations of them, can 
operate both to lock-in a particular token SRM research programme (when a less 
dangerous token is available) and/or to lock-in to deployment as part of the 
research process for any SRM technology (in other words, to lock-in to 
deployment from SRM as a type of research programme). The nature of the 
investment and infrastructure needed to scale up innovations in technologically 
well-developed societies probably makes some lock-in – of tokens and of types – 
inevitable. But some locked-in technologies are more dangerous than others. 
Indeed, we are in a climate crisis in large part because our predecessors locked-
in to a carbon-intensive global economic structure. If we are able to identify the 
potential for great danger in technological research programmes (as tokens or 
types) that might be in the process of locking-in, we should act in ways that 
thwart the locking-in and so avoid unnecessary endangerment of future people.  
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We know that in the process of socio-technical lock-in, earlier events in the 
sequence matter more than later ones. Earlier events capture technical, 
cognitive, political and psychological ground in ways that can crowd out features 
potentially in competition with what is getting locked-in, with the result that 
outcomes are certain to be not wholly - and are sometimes not at all – as good as 
they could be for the people, organisations, and societies living with the 
outcomes. The well-understood temporality of the process of lock-in makes it 
particularly germane to where we are now with SRM research. Given that we are 
right at the beginning of the possible development of SRM technologies, the 
governance choices we make now could make a disproportionately large 
contribution to the locked-in status of the technology in the future, along with 
the governance, frames, and expectations that will accompany it (Jamieson 
1996).  
 
To address this, governance proposals must contain strenuous flexibility 
mechanisms by which research programmes can be shackled, or even quickly 
shutdown, at minimal cost if the signs and signals of lock-in start to show. The 
massive losses that could follow for future people without these strenuous 
mechanisms justify their inclusion.16 The details of what shackling or shutdown 
means will vary according to the case. Shackling or shutdown could be achieved 
by withholding funding, or refusal of ethical approval for continuing research 
activities in the institutional setting of the research. If the research is much 
further progressed, treaties banning large-scale field experiments might be 
appropriate. There are obvious parallels here with various nuclear test ban 
treaties (Morrow, Kopp and Oppenheimer 2013). 
 
This leaves the second part of threshold likelihood, namely that the conditions 
for the functioning of the mechanism (through which massive losses could 
occur) are accumulating. In the case of governance stimulating SRM research, a 
 
16 Some existing governance reports have highlighted flexibility as a desirable 
feature of research governance regimes, but they defend this in the name of 
enabling research that changes over time with changing circumstances, whereas 
my case is for flexibility as a way of transforming stimulating governance into 
shackling governance (Morrow 2017). 
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significant part of this mechanism is lock-in.17 Assuming that governance 
proposals to stimulate research include strenuous shackling and shutdown 
provisions, is it the case that the conditions for the functioning of lock-in 
mechanisms are accumulating? Without knowing this, we do not know whether 
SRM research, and governance that aims to stimulate it, is a live danger calling 
for precaution itself (and thus without standing as a precaution against future 
climate impacts), or a latent danger that could be used as a precaution against 
future climate impacts because conditions in the world are not right for it to 
become dangerous. Establishing the answer to this question for SRM research 
and its governance – indeed, for any case we assess using Shue’s criteria – is an 
entirely empirical question. While the question is very far from settled, there is 
already some evidence that the framing of SRM could be generating cognitive 
lock-in to a more limited range of options than is justified once other frames are 
admitted into assessments of different scenarios for research and eventual 
deployment (Bellamy et al. 2012).  
 
Identifying the significance of knowing whether conditions are accumulating in a 
way that is likely to generate premature lock-in to particular SRM research 
programmes, and from these programmes to deployment, enables us to identify 
a further aspect of the bar of justification that governance proposals for SRM 
research must meet. Governance must include powerful oversight provisions for 
the continuous assessment of whether flexibility mechanisms must be activated 
to shackle or shutdown the research programmes stimulated by the governance 
frameworks laid out in the proposals.   
 
There is a variety of ways in which such oversight could be achieved. For 
example, Lin acknowledges the need for governance of SRM research that takes 
account of far more than the physical risks created by any research programme, 
and identifies lock-in as a ‘systemic concerns’ that must be addressed by an 
 
17 There may be additional mechanisms we should consider. In particular, the 
form of moral hazard involving mitigation deferral is worth considering because 
of how the operation of this mechanism could make the massive losses of climate 
change, and/or a termination effect, so much worse at some point in the future 
(Baatz 2016). 
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adequate governance framework for research (Lin 2015). A further example is 
Dilling and Hauser’s suggestion that project proposals be legally required to 
state how the research will address concerns that go beyond physical risks to 
include ‘decision-making power/responsibility for outcomes, and the societal 
meaning of the research’ (Stirling 2008, Stirling et al. 2008, Corner et al. 2012a, 
Preston 2012). What unites specific proposals in this area, regardless of their 
differences of detail, is a commitment to broadening out assessment of SRM 
research programmes through public participation and inclusion of more 
marginalised perspectives (MacMartin et al. 2014).  
 
While such proposals are a good start with respect to oversight, they rarely 
contain explicit and formal provisions for the protection of future people. Very 
often they are entirely bound to existing political institutions, so it is no surprise 
that they do not transcend the limits of these institutions with respect to the 
creation of robust governance requirements fit to offer future people genuine 
protection against the termination effect as a result of lock-in to a dangerous 
SRM technology that we, their predecessors, failed to avert. Whatever specific 
oversight provisions are adopted, they ought to be extended in this way, so as to 
provide an alert that existing governance that is stimulating SRM research 
should transform quickly into a shackle, perhaps to the point of shutting down 
the relevant research programmes altogether, if lock-in appears to be serious. 
The fact that none of our present global and transnational governance 
institutions and regimes adequately protect the interests of future people is no 
excuse for not seeking such governance in the SRM case. On the contrary, the 
governance of SRM offers an unusual and promising context of a governance 
vacuum in which new institutions and regimes could be created with ethically 
required components offering protection to future people that other governance 
structures could emulate. Creating new forms of governance for SRM research 
could be an opportunity for us to do better than our predecessors in creating 
institutions enabling us to meet our intergenerational obligations. 
 
Conclusion  
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I am not optimistic that shackling and shutdown mechanisms - along with 
ethically adequate oversight provisions - will be included in new governance 
frameworks for SRM research. It is more likely that new governance for SRM 
research will be grafted onto already existing institutions, hardly any of which 
offer ethically adequate protection to future people.18 Suppose that this is how 
things unfold over the coming decades and that future people in, say, 2300 
nevertheless find themselves in a best-case scenario world, as follows. In 2020, 
governance of SRM research stimulated research that progressed at speed and 
locked-in deployment, without oversight or management of the lock-in. SRM was 
deployed in 2060 for a relatively short time to slow the rate of change of global 
mean temperature, which enabled aggressive mitigation to take place. SRM 
deployment was gradually phased out from 2160, in a well-managed and 
responsible process(McKinnon 2017)(McKinnon 2017)(McKinnon 2017). In 
2300 global mean temperature has stabilised in accordance with the goals of the 
Paris Agreement.  
 
In this scenario, future people get lucky and are not damaged by our present 
failure to incorporate shackling and shutdown mechanisms, and oversight 
provisions, in SRM research governance. Even in this scenario, these future 
people have at least one well-grounded and serious moral complaint against us. 
This is that we knowingly imposed on them an impermissible risk of termination 
shock. We did this by failing to govern research in a way that would have 
prevented or minimised this via a provision to oversee, and potentially to 
shackle or shutdown parts of the research fit to create the danger. We cannot 
read back from the fact that ‘in the end, it turned out for the best’ to the 
conclusion that we acted permissibly in governing SRM at an earlier point in 
time. Our judgements of when and why prosecution of drunk drivers is justified 
shows the deep moral roots of this claim. We do not think that the fact that the 
driver hurt no-one lets them off the hook, morally speaking. Instead, we think 
that their dangerous behaviour makes them culpable (and makes prosecution 
justified) regardless of the fact that no-one was hurt. Indeed, we think this even if 
 
18 Things could be otherwise, without the world becoming a utopia (González-
Ricoy and Gosseries 2016).  
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the drunk driving not only caused no harm but actually did some good (for 
example, by enabling the drunk driver to attend the birth of her child, and so 
foster a lasting parental bond).  
 
In response, an SRM researcher might say: SRM research can be a precaution 
against climate impacts if there is no better precaution. If mitigation efforts are 
unlikely to work, the researcher might say, then there is in fact no better 
precaution than SRM research. But this reply is too coarse-grained. If it is true 
that we ought to take seriously SRM research as a precaution against climate 
impacts, there are still questions about how that research should be governed, 
and we can (at least in principle) choose between differently governed SRM 
research programmes in considering the case for SRM research as a precaution. 
My argument here is that SRM research governed with shackling or shutdown 
provisions, and the right kind of oversight, is a better precaution against climate 
impacts (if it is any precaution at all) than SRM research governed without these 
provisions. So taking seriously the principle that SRM research can be a 
precaution against climate impacts, if there is no better precaution, we should 
adopt my suggestions. 
 
Here, I have identified two desiderata of governance of SRM research that are 
generated by taking seriously our obligations not to wrong future people. My aim 
here has been to provide part of a toolkit for assessing the quality of our present 
choices with respect to governance for SRM research, despite deep uncertainty 
about the impact of climate change, and about the effects of SRM deployment, on 
future people. We have some knowledge about how and why technologies can 
lock-in, and that in some cases this can have seriously damaging impacts on 
those living with locked in technology. And we know that SRM research is at a 
stage at which the mechanisms of lock-in could start to operate. In this early 
stage of SRM research, lock-in could be slowed or stopped with the right kind of 
governance. If we do not achieve this governance we will wrong future people by 
recklessly endangering them, even if in fact these dangers end up not ripening 
into harms.  
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